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Summary
On 10 December 2008, the United Nations General Assembly unani-
mously adopted the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Optional Protocol ensures that, 
just like victims of civil and political rights violations, victims of economic, 
social and cultural rights violations have access to remedies at the inter-
national level. This article examines the Optional Protocol, starting with 
the historical background and its content, highlighting some of the main 
issues of controversy.
1 Introduction
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (Universal Declara-
tion) adopts a holistic approach, recognising the interrelatedness and 
indivisibility of human rights. It recognises that economic, social and 
cultural rights are indispensable for everyone’s dignity and the free 
development of their personality. The international community is, 
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therefore, required to ‘treat human rights globally in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis’.1 The Uni-
versal Declaration was a major step forward in the advancement of 
civilisation at the international and national levels.2 It continues to be 
a source of inspiration to national and international efforts to promote 
and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
‘Dignity and justice for all of us’, the theme of the 2008 year-long 
campaign of the United Nations (UN) leading up to the 60th anniver-
sary of the Universal Declaration could not have been more fitting, as 
this period witnessed a major step towards greater international social 
justice.3 The 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration was marked 
by a milestone: the achievement of an international complaints mecha-
nism for claiming socio-economic rights — the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR).4 This Optional Protocol brings about greater coherence in 
the human rights system, thus making human rights whole.5
Historically, economic, social and cultural rights have often been 
neglected. They have received less protection through enforcement 
mechanisms than civil and political rights. Unlike CESCR, 1966, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (CCPR) was 
adopted together with an Optional Protocol (OP1-ICCPR), establish-
ing a procedure for individual complaints.6 For over 30 years, victims 
of civil and political rights violations have had the opportunity to 
lodge complaints with the Human Rights Committee, the supervi-
sory body of CCPR. The individual complaints procedure under CCPR 
has helped victims of human rights violations and resulted in the 
clarification of the rights in CCPR. The Human Rights Committee has 
created a significant body of case law, requested interim measures, 
made declarations of violations, and recommended compensation to 
individual victims.
Victims of economic, social and cultural rights violations, on the 
other hand, have not had this benefit at the international level. This 
neglect of economic, social and cultural rights has observably been 
due to the general perception of these rights as programmatic, having 
1 World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
Part I, para 5, UN doc A/CONF 157/23, 12 July 1993.
2 A Eide & A Rosas ‘Economic, social and cultural rights: A universal challenge’ in 
A Eide et al (eds) Economic, social and cultural rights: A textbook (2001) 3.
3 On 10 December 2007 (Human Rights Day), the UN Secretary-General launched a 
year-long campaign to mark the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration.
4 Optional Protocol, Optional Protocol to CESCR or OP-ICESCR.
5 ‘Human rights made whole’, statement by Louise Arbour, then UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/
data/000068 (accessed 15 January 2009).
6 The First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
1966, which establishes an individual complaints procedure for victims of civil and 
political rights violations.
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to be realised gradually, and of a more political nature and not capable 
of judicial enforcement.7 However, the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee), academics and other 
writers have been influential in dispelling myths about economic, social 
and cultural rights.8 Courts have increasingly been willing to apply 
and enforce economic, social and cultural rights, even in countries 
where these rights are stated as mere principles to guide state policy.9 
In addition, Pennegård has pointed out that the difference between 
civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights can-
not be interpreted in a strict sense because, although the obligations 
they impose on governments may seem different at first sight, a more 
in-depth analysis often reveals a close connection and interrelationship 
between various human rights.10
The monitoring of the implementation of economic, social and 
cultural rights has, therefore, for several decades, been limited to the 
ESCR Committee’s consideration of state reports and other information 
submitted to it, mostly by non-governmental organisations (NGOs).11 
However, UN human rights bodies, governments, civil society and 
experts have been at work to remedy this long-term gap in human 
rights protection under the international system, by way of an Optional 
Protocol to CESCR.
Following years of difficult negotiations, the Optional Protocol to 
CESCR has finally been adopted. This article captures some of the key 
discussions during the development process of the Optional Proto-
col.12 However, before examining the content, it is important to first 
consider the historical background to the Optional Protocol to CESCR.
7 A Eide ‘Economic, social and cultural rights as human rights’ in Eide et al (n 2 above) 
14; M Craven ‘The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Eide et 
al (n 2 above) 470; H Steiner et al International human rights in context: Law, politics, 
morals (2007) 263-264.
8 See generally Eide et al (n 2 above).
9 See generally R Gargarella et al Courts and social transformation in new democracies: 
An institutional voice for the poor? (2006); J Squires et al (eds) The road to a remedy: 
Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005); Y Ghai 
& J Cottrell (eds) Economic, social and cultural rights in practice: The role of judges in 
implementing economic, social and cultural rights (2004).
10 A Pennegård ‘Overview over human rights: The regime of the UN’ in G Alfredsson et 
al (eds) International human rights monitoring mechanisms (2001) 27-28.
11 Arts 16 & 17 of CESCR require states to submit reports on the measures which they 
have taken and the progress made in achieving observance of the rights in CESCR.
12 It should be noted that throughout the sessions of the Open-Ended Working Group 
on an OP-ICESCR, though some states sustained their positions on various issues, 
the position of other states changed at various sessions. Hence, this article tries 
to capture the latest position of states as contained in the reports of the Working 
Group.
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2 Historical background
This section traces the journey from 1990, when the ESCR Committee 
started discussing the desirability and modalities of an individual com-
plaints procedure for economic, social and cultural rights through an 
Optional Protocol to CESCR.13 Subsequently, the 1993 Vienna Declara-
tion and Programme of Action urged the UN Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR), the predecessor to the Human Rights Council, in co-
operation with the ESCR Committee, to continue work on an Optional 
Protocol to CESCR.14 In an analytical paper, the Committee submit-
ted that there were strong reasons for the adoption of a complaints 
procedure in respect of CESCR.15 Consensus was reached within the 
ESCR Committee on the need for an individual complaints procedure 
in 1996. The ESCR Committee then finalised a draft Optional Protocol, 
which was presented to the UNCHR in 1997.16 In the same year, the 
UNCHR requested the Secretary-General to transmit the text to states, 
inter-governmental organisations and NGOs for their comments. This 
process took three years. There was very little enthusiasm at this stage 
due to a lack of political consensus on the text, particularly among 
states. Most member states did not submit comments while NGOs 
strongly supported the draft Optional Protocol. The few states that 
submitted comments in favour of an Optional Protocol were Croatia, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Georgia, Germany, 
Lebanon, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway and Portugal; while 
Canada and Sweden expressed doubts on its desirability.17
There was, however, some progress in 2001. The UNCHR organised, 
together with the International Commission of Jurists, a two-day work-
shop on the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, with 
particular reference to an Optional Protocol to CESCR. In the same year, 
the UNCHR decided to appoint an independent expert to examine the 
question of a draft Optional Protocol and the comments made on it 
by states, inter-governmental organisations and NGOs as well as the 
report of a workshop held in 2001 on the justiciability of economic, 
13 For additional reading on the historical background and benefits of the OP-ICESCR, 
see L Chenwi & C Mbazira ‘The Draft Optional Protocol to the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2006) 7(1) ESR Review 9.
14 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para 75.
15 ‘Contribution du Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels’ UN Doc A/CONF 
157/PC/62/Add.5, 26 March 1993, annex II.
16 Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, contained in UN Doc E/CN 4/1997/105, 18 December 1996.
17 W Vandenhole ‘An Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ para 36, Working paper at the Expert Seminar on An 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
organised by the Institute for Human Rights, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, 
30 November 2001, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/humanrights/ebib/Proceed-
ings30112001.doc (accessed 15 January 2009).
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social and cultural rights.18 The independent expert was required to 
report back to the UNCHR at its 58th session.
The independent expert, Hatem Kotrane, held a series of consul-
tations with UN bodies and states and, in 2002, submitted his first 
report, in favour of the adoption of an Optional Protocol.19 The 
mandate of the expert was renewed in order to allow him to study 
in greater detail the nature and scope of state parties’ obligations 
under CESCR, the question of the justiciability of economic, social 
and cultural rights, and questions as to the benefits and practicability 
of a complaints mechanism under CESCR and the issue of comple-
mentarity between different mechanisms.20 In his second report, the 
independent expert recommended that the UNCHR establish, at its 
59th session, an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) with the man-
date to consider options regarding the elaboration of an Optional 
Protocol to CESCR.21
In 2003, the UNCHR established the OEWG.22 The UNCHR requested 
the Working Group to meet for a period of ten working days, prior to 
the 60th session of the Commission, with a view to considering options 
regarding the elaboration of an Optional Protocol, in the light of, 
amongst others, the report of the ESCR Committee on a draft Optional 
Protocol, comments and views submitted by states, intergovernmental 
organisations, including UN specialised agencies, and NGOs, and the 
reports of the independent expert. The OEWG held five sessions — in 
2004 (23 February to 5 March), 2005 (10 to 20 January), 2006 (6 to 
16 February), 2007 (16 to 27 July) and 2008 (4 to 8 February 2008 and 
31 March to 4 April 2008).
At the end of its first session, the OEWG did not reach consensus on 
whether to start drafting an Optional Protocol.23 At its second session 
in 2005, the OEWG gave the Chairperson, Catarina de Albuquerque, 
a mandate to prepare a report containing elements of an Optional 
Protocol with a view to facilitating the discussions. The Elements Paper 
addressed a range of issues, including the scope of the rights to a com-
munication procedure, admissibility criteria, standing, proceedings on 
the merits, friendly settlement of disputes, interim measures, views, 
18 See generally Resolution 2001/30 of 20 April 2001, UN Doc E/CN 4/2002/50.
19 Report of the Independent Expert on the Question of a Draft Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/CN 
4/2002/57.
20 Resolution 2002/24 of 22 April 2002, UN Doc E/CN 4/RES/2002/24.
21 Report by Mr Hatem Kotrane, Independent Expert on the Question of a Draft 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, UN Doc E/CN 4/2003/53, para 76.
22 Resolution 2003/18 of 22 April 2003, UN Doc E/CN 4/2003/L 11/Add 3.
23 Report of the Open-Ended Working Group to Consider Options Regarding the 
Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights on its First Session, UN Doc E/CN 4/2004/44, 15 March 
2004 (Report of the First Session of the OEWG) para 76.
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follow-up procedures, reservations, inquiry procedure, inter-state 
procedure, the Optional Protocol and domestic decisions on resource 
allocation, the relationship of the Optional Protocol with existing 
mechanisms, and international co-operation and assistance.24 The Ele-
ments Paper allowed for a focused discussion on the main elements 
of an individual communications procedure at the third session of the 
OEWG.
Following the third session of the OEWG, the debate shifted from 
whether economic, social and cultural rights should be subject to a 
complaints procedure to what the specific nature and modalities of 
such a procedure should be. The Human Rights Council, at its first ses-
sion, renewed the mandate of the OEWG for a further two years so 
that it could elaborate on an Optional Protocol.25 The Human Rights 
Council requested the Chairperson of the OEWG to prepare a draft 
Optional Protocol to be used as a basis for future negotiations. The 
Council also requested the OEWG to meet for ten working days each 
year, and directed that a representative of the ESCR Committee should 
attend these meetings as a resource person. Between 2007 and 2008 
several drafts were discussed.
Though the journey has been riddled with obstacles and setbacks, 
revolving mainly on continuing doubts about the justiciability of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, a milestone in the history of universal 
human rights has been achieved. The OEWG completed its mandate 
in April 2008 with the transmission of the draft Optional Protocol to 
the Human Rights Council, which subsequently adopted it by consen-
sus in June 2008. The Human Rights Council recommended that the 
UN General Assembly adopts the Optional Protocol.26 In November 
2008, the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly approved by 
consensus a draft resolution on the adoption of the Optional Proto-
col to CESCR, recommending its adoption and, similar to the Human 
Rights Council Resolution, that it be opened for signature in 2009.27 
The General Assembly adopted by consensus the Optional Protocol on 
10 December 2008, the day of the 60th anniversary of the Universal 
24 Elements for an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/CN 4/2006/WG.23/2, 21 November 2005 (Elements 
Paper).
25 Resolution 1/3 of 29 June 2006, para 1.
26 Resolution on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/8/L.2/Rev 1/corr 1, 18 June 2008.
27 Resolution A/C 3/63/L.47, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, contained in UN Doc A/63/435, 28 Novem-
ber 2008. See also Third Committee Recommends General Assembly Adoption of 
Optional Protocol to International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’, UN Doc GA/SHC/3938, 18 November 2008. Fifty-two member states co-
sponsored the Resolution.
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Declaration.28 The Optional Protocol will be open for signature this 
year (2009) and will come into force after ten ratifications.29
3 Contents of the Optional Protocol
The Optional Protocol reaffirms the universality, indivisibility and inter-
relatedness of all human rights.30 It refers to the principles of equality 
and non-discrimination as embodied in the UN Charter, 1945, the 
Universal Declaration, CCPR and CESCR.31 The listed grounds of dis-
crimination are ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.32
The Optional Protocol further considers it appropriate to enable the 
ESCR Committee to carry out the functions in the Optional Protocol as 
a means of furthering the achievement of the purpose of CESCR and 
the implementation of the provisions therein.33 Hence, article 1 of the 
Optional Protocol recognises the competence of the ESCR Committee 
to receive and consider communications alleging violations of the eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights set forth in CESCR by a state party to 
the Protocol. The ESCR Committee has the discretion to, if necessary, 
‘decline to consider a communication where it does not reveal that 
the author has suffered a clear disadvantage, unless the Committee 
considers that the communication raises a serious issue of general 
importance’.34 This provision was included because of the need to add 
in a threshold that would allow the ESCR Committee not to deal with 
complaints of minor importance.
The Optional Protocol also provides for the possibility of interim 
measures in ‘exceptional circumstances’,35 allows for the friendly settle-
ment of disputes,36 creates an inter-state complaints procedure37 and 
28 ‘Closing a historic gap in human rights’ UN press release http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
huricane/huricane.nsf/0/D39BD9ED5406650FC125751C0039FE08?opendocument 
(accessed 15 January 2009).
29 See art 18(1) OP-ICESCR.
30 Preambular para 3. In drafting the Preambular paragraphs, inspiration was drawn 
from the Preambles of the OP1-ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 (OP-CEDAW).
31 Preambular para 1.
32 Preambular para 2.
33 Preambular para 5.
34 Art 4. The inclusion of this provision was proposed by the United Kingdom, Canada 
and New Zealand, supported by Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Poland, 
Sweden and the United States (see Report of the Open-Ended Working Group to 
Consider Options Regarding the Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its Fifth Session, UN Doc 
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an inquiry procedure,38 and provides for follow-up mechanisms.39 It 
requires state parties to ‘take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
individuals under its jurisdiction are not subjected to any form of ill-
treatment or intimidation as a consequence of communicating with 
the Committee’.40 This provision ensures that the rights and safety 
of those who use the communication procedure are guaranteed and 
protected. This provision is identical to article 11 of Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 1979 (OP-CEDAW). Its inclusion was not the subject 
of much discussion; it had, actually, not been discussed prior to the 
fourth session of the OEWG.41
The subsequent paragraphs consider, in more detail, the discussions 
around some of the provisions of the Optional Protocol: who can bring 
a complaint and the rights that are covered, admissibility criteria and 
the standard of review to be applied in considering communications, 
international co-operation and assistance and the establishment of a 
fund.
3.1 The rights covered
Communications must relate to a violation of any of the economic, 
social and cultural rights.42 The main questions raised during the dis-
cussions related to whether the procedure should apply to all of the 
rights recognised in CESCR or only to some; and whether states should 
be allowed, on ratification, to choose the rights that would apply to 
them.
Various approaches were proposed, including: a comprehensive 
approach, allowing for communications under any of the rights in 
CESCR;43 a limited approach, limiting the procedure to parts II and 
III of CESCR; and an à la carte approach (including the opt-out or 
reservation approaches), allowing states to choose the rights or levels 
38 Arts 11 & 12.
39 Art 9 (follow-up of the views of the ESCR Committee), and art 12 (follow-up to the 
inquiry procedure). 
40 Art 13.
41 The states that supported the inclusion of protection measures included Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, Iran, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Switzerland and the United States (see Report 
of the Open-Ended Working Group to Consider Options Regarding the Elaboration 
of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights on its Fourth Session, UN Doc A/HRC/6/8, 30 August 2007, para 119 
(Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG); and Report of the Fifth Session of the 
OEWG, para 103).
42 Art 2.
43 The ESCR Committee favours a comprehensive approach (see Report of the Open-
Ended Working Group to Consider Options Regarding the Elaboration of an Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 
its Third Session, UN Doc E/CN 4/2006/47, 14 March 2006 (Report of the Third Ses-
sion of the OEWG) para 32.
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of obligations that would apply to them. All existing communication 
procedures under the international system adopt the comprehensive 
approach. Hence, the à la carte approach is unprecedented within the 
UN human rights treaty-based system.
However, a number of states supported the à la carte approach at 
various sessions, arguing that a selective approach would enable a 
larger number of states to become parties to the Protocol and allow 
states to limit the procedure to those rights for which domestic reme-
dies exist.44 Poland and the United Kingdom preferred another version 
of an à la carte approach, the ‘opt-in approach’, arguing that the 
approach would allow states to add further rights at a later stage while 
not preventing other states from accepting petitions, and that opt-out 
from certain rights might send the signal that these rights were less 
important.45 The arguments for an opt-out clause related to the non-
justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, the competence of 
the ESCR Committee and the difference in the situations of states. For 
instance, in states where economic, social and cultural rights have not 
yet been made justiciable, they would be able to freely determine the 
provisions and obligations arising from CESCR that they are ready to 
assume.
A majority of states supported a comprehensive approach.46 Their 
support for the comprehensive approach was based on the following: 
that an à la carte approach would establish a hierarchy among human 
rights, disregard the interrelatedness of provisions of CESCR, amend 
the substance of CESCR, disregard the interest of the victims, and defy 
the purpose of the Optional Protocol to strengthen the implementa-
tion of all economic, social and cultural rights.47 Those that supported 
a comprehensive approach therefore saw the à la carte approach as a 
44 The states are Australia, China, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and the United States (see Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 
37).
45 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 38.
46 Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile, Congo, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Guatemala, Italy, 
Iran, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Morocco, Peru, Portugal, 
Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay and 
Venezuela (see Explanatory Memorandum, Annex II to the Draft Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights prepared by 
the Chaiperson-Rapporteur, Catarina de Albuquerque, UN Doc A/HRC/7/WG 4/2, 23 
April 2007, paras 4 & 15 (Explanatory Memorandum)); Report of the Fourth Session 
of the OEWG, para 33. It should be noted that France initially supported an opt-out 
approach, but was later persuaded to support the comprehensive approach; and 
Norway took a retrogressive step at the 5th session of the OEWG by shifting from 
supporting a comprehensive approach to an à la carte approach at the 5th session 
of the OEWG.
47 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 33.
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way of introducing a hierarchy of rights.48 It was further argued that 
the approach would undermine the integrity and independence of the 
rights in CESCR, as it would allow states to ‘opt out’ of the obligation 
to provide effective remedies to particular rights or components of 
rights in CESCR.49 This would also reinforce the idea that some rights 
are different in nature and require a lesser level of protection than oth-
ers do, and would ignore the importance of maintaining a unitary and 
indivisible framework of human rights obligations. Furthermore, such 
an approach would contradict the principle enunciated clearly by the 
CESCR Committee that ‘effective remedies’ should be made available 
to all rights recognised in CESCR, even if such remedies may not always 
be judicial.50 It was noted during the discussions that, based on experi-
ence from the European system, an à la carte approach has not helped 
in promoting a full understanding of the provisions of the European 
Social Charter, 1961, resulting in the creation of different charters for 
different countries.51
It should be noted that though Egypt was, generally, in favour of 
a comprehensive approach, it indicated at the fourth session of the 
OEWG that it would be able to accept the exclusion of part I of CESCR 
from the Optional Protocol.52 Australia, Greece, India, Morocco, Russia 
and the United States also favoured excluding part I of CESCR.53 This 
exclusion would mean that the right to self-determination would not 
be subject to the communications procedure. The right to self-deter-
mination is also included in CCPR and is already formally subject to 
individual complaints under the OP1-ICCPR. The position of the ESCR 
Committee has always been that, in addition to its civil and political 
dimensions, this right has economic, social and cultural dimensions 
that merit protection under the Optional Protocol.54 The exclusion of 
this right would, therefore, deny victims their rights to cultural, eco-
nomic and social self-determination.
The Optional Protocol does not make reference to any of the parts 
of CESCR, as it requires that a communication must allege a viola-
tion of ‘any of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in 
48 Report of the Open-Ended Working Group to Consider Options Regarding the Elab-
oration of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights on its Second Session, UN Doc E/CN 4/2005/52, 10 February 
2005 (Report of the Second Session of the OEWG), para 37.
49 Joint Submission of the NGO Coalition to the 2006 Open-Ended Working Group to 
Consider Options for an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, January 2006; see also Report of the Third Session 
of the OEWG, para 33.
50 L Chenwi ‘First reading of the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2007) 8(4) ESR Review 22 23.
51 Report of the Second Session of the OEWG, para 52.
52 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 35.
53 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 36.
54 Chenwi & Mbazira (n 13 above) 11.
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the Covenant’. Hence, it remains open whether the ESCR Committee 
interprets this to include or exclude the right to self-determination or at 
least some components of the right.
3.2 Standing
Communications can be submitted by (1) individuals, (2) groups of 
individuals, or (3) other persons on their behalf, claiming to be victims 
of a violation.55 With regard to the latter group, consent has to be 
obtained unless the author of the communication can justify acting on 
the victims’ behalf without such consent. This exception was inspired 
by article 2 of OP-CEDAW. Its inclusion was proposed by Brazil, Chile, 
Portugal, Uruguay and the NGO Coalition,56 amongst others, as an 
alternative to the requirement of express consent that was being pro-
posed by some states.57 The difference between the Optional Protocol 
to CESCR and OP1-ICCPR is that the latter does not explicitly refer to 
groups having standing, as it uses the terminology ‘individuals’.58 
However, in practice, the Human Rights Committee has allowed com-
munications from a group acting on behalf of a victim or from groups 
whose members were individual victims.59 Hence, the Optional Pro-
tocol to CESCR has reinforced this practice by granting standing to 
groups.
During the discussions, there was the question of whether to allow 
NGOs to submit collective communications, which resulted in the 
inclusion of a provision on collective complaints in earlier drafts. It 
allowed international NGOs with consultative status before the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to submit communications 
alleging unsatisfactory implementation by any state of the right in 
CESCR.60 This procedure had no victim requirement and the elements 
of the procedure were derived from the example of the European Social 
55 Art 2.
56 The NGOs’ campaign for the complaints procedure for economic, social and cultural 
rights has been mobilised mainly through the NGO Coalition for an Optional Proto-
col (NGO Coalition). For more information on the NGO Coalition and its work, see 
http://www.opicescr-coalition.org (accessed 15 January 2009).
57 Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Egypt (on behalf of the African Group), Ethiopia, 
Morocco and Russia proposed that individuals must give prior ‘expressed’ consent 
before communications can be brought on their behalf. However, Ecuador, Peru 
and the NGO Coalition opposed this submission, arguing that it might be difficult 
to obtain express consent in certain cases (see Report of the Fourth Session of the 
OEWG, para 43). It should be noted that at the 5th session of the OEWG, Egypt (on 
behalf of the African Group) together with Finland, Italy, Lichtenstein, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and NGOs supported the retention of the exception to the 
consent requirement (see Report of the Fifth Session, para 37).
58 Art 1 OP1-ICCPR.
59 E de Wet ‘Recent developments concerning the Draft Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic Social Cultural Rights’ (1997) 13 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 514 533.
60 Art 3 of the Draft OP-ICESCR, UN Doc A/HRC/6/WG 4/2, 23 April 2007. 
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Charter’s collective complaints mechanism. However, the provision 
did not receive much support. Since NGOs do have standing under 
article 2 when acting in a representative capacity for victims, there 
was substantial consensus during the discussions that the provision 
be deleted.61 The unwillingness of the OEWG to include a provision on 
collective complaints echoes the practice of the Human Rights Commit-
tee, which is to the effect that NGOs cannot submit a communication 
in the public interest without having to act on behalf of individuals or 
groups of individuals.62
An important point worth noting with regard to article 2 is that the 
Optional Protocol is silent on whether or not the NGOs acting on behalf 
of victims must have consultative status before the UN ECOSOC before 
they can submit a communication.
3.3 Admissibility criteria
National remedies that are accessible and effective are the primary 
means of protecting economic and social rights.63 Accordingly, similar 
to other human rights treaties at both the international and regional 
level, in order for a communication to be considered by the ESCR Com-
mittee, all available domestic remedies have to be exhausted, unless 
where the application of such remedies is unreasonably prolonged.64 
The exception to the exhaustion of local remedies rule that a commu-
nication may be declared admissible if local remedies are ‘unlikely to 
bring effective relief’, which is contained in OP-CEDAW, for instance, 
has been left out.65 In an earlier draft, ‘unlikely to bring effective relief’ 
was also an exception, but its deletion was proposed by Burkina Faso, 
Ecuador, Egypt (on behalf of the African Group), Poland and the United 
States.66
The exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement provides a state 
with an opportunity to redress any wrongs that it may have committed 
— to remedy the alleged violation — before the case is brought to the 
ESCR Committee. It also prevents the ESCR Committee from becom-
61 The states that called for its deletion included Algeria, Australia, Belarus, Burkina 
Faso, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt (on behalf of the African Group), Greece, 
India, Japan, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Senegal, Tan-
zania, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, the United States and Venezuela (see Report of 
the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 47).
62 De Wet (n 59 above) 533.
63 See S Liebenberg ‘The protection of economic and social rights in domestic legal 
systems’ in Eide et al (n 2 above) 55; ESCR Committee General Comment 9 on the 
domestic application of CESCR, para 4, UN Doc E/C 12/1998/24, 3 December 1998.
64 Art 3.
65 See art 4(1) of OP-CEDAW; see also art 2(d) of the Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2007 (not yet in force).
66 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 59.
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ing a tribunal of first instance for cases for which an effective domestic 
remedy exists.67
A practical question arises with regard to this requirement in situa-
tions where economic, social and cultural rights are not provided for 
as justiciable rights. Would this mean that domestic remedies are not 
available? Viljoen observes that ‘a remedy is “available” if it can be uti-
lised as a matter of fact and without impediment’.68 Where economic, 
social and cultural rights are not justiciable, access to courts in order 
to seek direct enforcement and protection of these rights becomes dif-
ficult. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) is of the view that where courts are prevented from tak-
ing up cases, local remedies become non-existent and that if a right is 
not well provided for in domestic law, there cannot be effective rem-
edies or any remedies at all.69 In addition, in the Inter-American system, 
where domestic legislation does not afford due process of law for the 
protection of rights, the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is 
not applicable.70
However, domestic remedies are not limited to judicial remedies. 
Economic, social and cultural rights may be subject to judicial or 
quasi-judicial remedies such as national human rights commissions, 
the ombudsman or administrative complaints.71 The provision in the 
Optional Protocol to CESCR is similar to that in the OP1-ICCPR,72 and 
the Human Rights Committee has explained that the requirement to 
exhaust ‘all available domestic remedies’ in the latter ‘not only refers 
to judicial but also to administrative remedies’.73 The Human Rights 
Committee has also pointed out that if administrative remedies are 
67 Viljoen has elucidated on the purpose of the requirement to exhaust domestic 
remedies when discussing the protective mandate of the African Commission (see 
F Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (2007) 336).
68 Viljoen (n 67 above) 336. See also T Zwart The admissibility of human rights petitions: 
The case law of the European Commission of Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Committee (1994) 188, stating that ‘a remedy is considered available only if the peti-
tioner can make use of it in the circumstances of his case’.
69 See Media Rights Agenda & Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998) paras 
49-5; Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Another v Nigeria (2001) 
AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001) paras 37 & 41 (SERAC case). 
70 Art 46(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights 1969.
71 A Rosas & M Scheinin ‘Implementation mechanisms and remedies’ in Eide et al (n 
2 above) 452. See also Report of the Second Session of the OEWG, para 43. In fact, 
at the 5th session of the OEWG, some states proposed that the list of remedies be 
specified instead of simply referring to ‘domestic remedies’. These included Den-
mark, Greece, New Zealand, Poland and the United Kingdom, who wanted the list 
of remedies to be mentioned — ‘judicial, administrative and other’ remedies (see 
Report of the Fifth Session of the OEWG, para 47). This proposal did not receive 
much support as it was seen as unnecessary.
72 See art 5(2)(b) of OP1-ICCPR.
73 See, eg, Brough v Australia, Communication 1184/2003, UN Doc CCPR/
C/86/D/1184/2003, 27 April 2006, para 8.6.
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the only remedies available, they have to be exhausted.74 The ESCR 
Committee, in dealing with the domestic application of CESCR, has 
observed that75
[t]he right to an effective remedy need not be interpreted as always requiring 
a judicial remedy. Administrative remedies will, in many cases, be adequate 
and those living within the jurisdiction of a state party have a legitimate 
expectation, based on the principle of good faith, that all administrative 
authorities will take account of the requirements of the Covenant in their 
decision making. Any such administrative remedies should be accessible, 
affordable, timely and effective. An ultimate right of judicial appeal from 
administrative procedures of this type would also often be appropriate.
It is important to note that the particular circumstance of the individual 
case would be relevant in any determination of whether domestic 
remedies are in fact available.76 Where no domestic remedies exist, 
a petitioner would be able to take a communication straight to the 
international level.77
In addition to the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement, 
communications have to be submitted within one year after the 
exhaustion of such remedies, unless the author of the communication 
can show that it was not possible for him or her to submit the com-
munication within this time frame.78 Initially, the time limit was six 
months, but it was felt by a number of states and the NGO Coalition 
that this was particularly restrictive given the potential complexity of 
economic, social and cultural rights claims and the impact it may have 
on access to justice for victims of violations of these rights.79
Article 3 further elaborates other grounds on which a communica-
tion may be declared inadmissible. These are where the facts that are 
the subject of the communication occurred prior to the entry into force 
of the present Protocol for the state party concerned, unless those facts 
continued after that date; where the same matter has already been 
74 See generally SS v Norway, Communication 79/1980, UN Doc CCPR/C/15/D/79/1980, 
2 April 1982.
75 ESCR Committee General Comment 9, para 9. It should be noted that parliamen-
tary procedures do not, however, qualify as judicial or quasi-judicial remedies, even 
though they might end up providing redress to a complainant (see Report of the 
Second Session of the OEWG, para 92).
76 The European Court of Human Rights, eg, has on several occasions emphasised that 
‘the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is neither absolute nor capable of being 
applied automatically; in reviewing whether the rule has been observed, it is essen-
tial to have regard to the particular circumstances of the individual case’. Hence, 
‘the court must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in 
the legal system of the contracting state concerned but also of the general context 
in which they operate, as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant’ (see, 
eg, Van Oosterwijck v Belgium, Application 7654/76, para 35, 6 November 1980; and 
Isayeva v Russia, Application 57950/00, 24 February 2005, para 153).
77 See Report of the Second Session of the OEWG, para 43.
78 Art 3(2)(a) OP-ICESCR. 
79 The Netherlands, Peru, South Africa and Spain, eg, proposed extending the time 
limit to one or three years (see Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 61).
ahrlj-2009-1-text.indd   36 6/23/09   10:44:07 AM
examined by the ESCR Committee or has been or is being examined 
under another procedure of international investigation or settlement; 
where it is incompatible with the provisions of CESCR; where it is mani-
festly ill-founded, not sufficiently substantiated or exclusively based 
on reports disseminated by mass media;80 where it is an abuse of the 
right to submit a communication; or where it is anonymous or not in 
writing.81
Some states had proposed the inclusion of the requirement that 
regional remedies must be exhausted first before a complaint can 
be lodged with the ESCR Committee, as a means of ensuring that 
the communications procedure under CESCR would not undermine 
existing procedures in regional human rights systems.82 It was also 
noted that regional mechanisms were better positioned to take into 
account a state’s level of development.83 However, a number of states 
as well as the NGO Coalition opposed the proposal arguing that such 
a criterion, combined with the prohibition to admit matters already 
examined, would prevent victims from accessing the system and intro-
duce a hierarchy between international and regional mechanisms.84 It 
was also argued that regional mechanisms differed widely and none 
corresponded fully with a complaints procedure under CESCR.85 This 
criterion has not been included in the Optional Protocol. This exclusion 
is plausible, as regional mechanisms should play a complementary role 
to UN mechanisms rather than provide a basis for denying complaints 
from regions where regional remedies are available.
3.4 Interim measures
The capacity to prescribe interim measures is one of the most important 
functions of any judicial or quasi-judicial body adjudicating complaints. 
For any complaints mechanism to be fully effective, it must be able to 
perform a pre-emptive function — to stop harm before it can occur, or 
to stop an ongoing harm from continuing, or at least mitigating the 
effects of that harm. In fact, all UN communication procedures make 
provision for interim measures either in the rules of procedure of the 
respective committees or in a treaty provision. Compliance with interim 
80 This criterion is derived from art 56(4) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 1982 (African Charter), a proposal that was put forward by the NGO Coali-
tion (see Report of the fourth Session of the OEWG, para 61).
81 Art 3(2)(b-g) OP-ICESCR.
82 These states include Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Kingdom, which 
had initially indicated that victims should be free to decide which procedure to use 
(see Report of the Third Session of the OEWG, para 52; and Report of the Fourth 
Session of the OEWG, para 62).
83 Report of the Third Session of the OEWG, para 52.
84 These states include Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Norway, Peru and Portugal (see 
Report of the Third Session of the OEWG, para 54; and Report of the Fourth Session, 
para 62).
85 Report of the Third Session of the OEWG, para 54.
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO CESCR 37
ahrlj-2009-1-text.indd   37 6/23/09   10:44:07 AM
38 (2009) 9 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
measures does not only ensure respect for human rights but they are, 
as Viljoen states, aimed at upholding the integrity of the body that will 
take the final decision.86
During the discussions of the OEWG, a number of states and the 
NGO Coalition highlighted the need for the ESCR Committee to have 
the power to request interim measures.87 Accordingly, the Optional 
Protocol in article 5 enables the ESCR Committee to respond to excep-
tional or life-threatening situations in order to avoid possible irreparable 
harm to the victim(s) of the alleged violation. The risk of such harm 
would have to be sufficiently substantiated. The request to take interim 
measures can be made at any time after the receipt of a communica-
tion and before a determination on the merits has been reached. A 
state is required to act on such request with urgency.88
Furthermore, a proposal that a linkage should be established between 
the use of interim measures and the capacity or resources available to 
the state concerned was not incorporated,89 the reasons being that 
such a provision is not contained in any of the existing communications 
procedures and, based on its practice in considering state reports, the 
ESCR Committee would be expected to take into account the issue of 
resource constraints in the consideration of interim measures and com-
munications in general.90 Some states opposed referring to resource 
availability, as states are obliged to avoid possible irreparable damage 
at all times.91
Among the states that had reservations as to the inclusion of interim 
measures in general were Japan, which, surprisingly, found it difficult 
to imagine an urgent situation requiring interim measures given the 
nature of economic, social and cultural rights and questioned the need 
for such measures.92 Others wanted states to be given an opportunity 
86 Viljoen (n 67 above) 326.
87 These states include Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, 
Finland, France, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Morocco (on behalf of the African Group), 
Portugal, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Uruguay and Venezuela (see Report of the 
Third Session of the OEWG, para 65; Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 
67; and Report of the Fifth Session of the OEWG, para 60). It should be noted that 
Germany, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland proposed the inclusion of interim 
measures in the rules of procedures instead.
88 In initial drafts, the urgency of interim measures was not emphasised. Consequently, 
the NGO Coalition, supported by Colombia and Uruguay, amongst others, argued 
that interim measures should be considered with urgency in order to protect victims 
of violations (see Chenwi (n 50 above) 24).
89 Proposed by Morocco, supported by China, Ethiopia, India and Nepal (see Report of 
the Third Session of the OEWG, para 137; Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, 
para 72; and Report of the Fifth Session of the OEWG, para 62).
90 Explanatory Memorandum paras 18 & 19.
91 Australia, Belgium, Egypt, France, South Africa, Switzerland, Syria and Venezuela 
(see Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 72; and Report of the Fifth 
Session of the OEWG, para 62).
92 Report of the Third Session of the OEWG, para 66.
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to comment on the appropriateness of interim measures prior to their 
application, which, apparently, defeats the whole purpose of interim 
measures.93
Another issue that came up during the discussions on interim mea-
sures was a proposal by Norway and Sweden to specify in the text the 
voluntary nature of requests for interim measures. Such specification 
would limit the purpose of interim measures. The proposal was not 
incorporated, with some states noting that its inclusion was not neces-
sary since the ESCR Committee’s views and requests were non-binding 
and voluntary in nature.94
The practical challenge would be to get states to comply with a 
request to take interim measures. Based on a comprehensive study of 
interim measures ordered in human rights cases before international 
enforcement bodies, Pasqualucci concludes that, though states have 
generally accepted the decisions of international courts that interim 
measures are binding, many states have not yet accepted the view that 
interim measures specified by international quasi-judicial bodies are 
also binding on them.95 This is a critical challenge if one looks at, for 
instance, the African human rights system, where ‘states almost uni-
formly disregarded’ such requests made by the African Commission, 
though not in the context of economic, social and cultural rights.96
3.5 Friendly settlement
Friendly settlement is a general principle of international law. It is 
included explicitly in article 41(1)(e) of CCPR, article 21(1)(c) of the 
Convention against Torture, Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, 1984 (CAT) and article 76(d) of the International 
Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, 1990 (CRMW). It is also recognised in the Inter-American, 
European and African human rights systems.
Accordingly, article 7 makes provision for friendly settlement of 
disputes and it is applicable to all communications. A friendly settle-
ment agreement closes consideration of a communication,97 despite 
warnings by Brazil, Switzerland and the NGO Coalition that no com-
munication should be closed before a friendly settlement has been 
fully implemented.98
93 Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Poland and the United Kingdom (see Report of the Third 
Session of the OEWG, para 66; and Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, paras 
74 and 182).
94 Report of the Fifth Session of the OEWG, para 66.
95 See, generally, J Pasqualucci ‘Interim measures in international human rights: Evolu-
tion and harmonisation’ (2005) 38 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1.
96 See Viljoen (n 67 above) 326-329.
97 Art 7(2) OP-ICESCR.
98 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 86.
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A number of states and the NGO Coalition supported its inclusion,99 
while others wanted the friendly settlement procedure to apply only 
to inter-state communications.100 The success of a friendly settlement 
mechanism depends on its ability to guarantee the rights of both the 
individual and society as a whole, and must, therefore, not prejudice 
the subsequent consideration of a communication should the efforts 
for a friendly settlement fail. Hence, those that supported its inclusion 
proposed that it should be subject to one or more of the following 
safeguards: fairness; good faith; respect for human rights; optional 
character; close monitoring of the implementation of the settlement; 
possibility to return to the adversarial procedure in the case the friendly 
settlement fails or is unduly delayed; possibility of the ESCR Committee 
to end the settlement at any time and continue with the consideration 
of the communication, and the terms of the settlement should be sub-
ject to review and approval by the ESCR Committee.101 However, there 
were oppositions to the Committee reviewing friendly settlements, 
arguing that it would undermine the nature of such a settlement.102
Notwithstanding, the ESCR Committee might consider the review 
of such settlements in its Rules of Procedure. For a friendly settlement 
procedure to be effective, the possibility of the ESCR Committee con-
sidering the communication should be left open until the settlement 
agreement itself has been implemented fully.
3.6 Examination of communications and the standard of review
The relevant documentation that the ESCR Committee may consult 
when examining a communication are those emanating from other 
UN bodies, specialised agencies, funds, programmes and mechanisms, 
and other international organisations, including regional human rights 
systems, and any observations or comments by the state party con-
cerned.103 In addition, the standard of review in socio-economic rights 
cases is that of reasonableness.104
The key issues that arose during the discussions of the OEWG were 
whether oral hearings should be allowed; whether regional mecha-
99 These states include Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Den-
mark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, 
Russia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Venezuela (see 
Report of the Third Session of the OEWG, para 64; Report of the Fourth Session of 
the OEWG, paras 80 & 183.
100 These states are China, India, Sweden and the United States (see Report of the Fourth 
Session of the OEWG, para 81; and report of the Fifth Session of the OEWG, para 
72.
101 Report of the Third Session of the OEWG, paras 64 & 185.
102 Australia, China, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela, amongst 
others (see Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, paras 87 & 185).
103 Art 8(3).
104 Art 8(4).
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nisms should be consulted; and the standard the ESCR Committee 
would apply in its assessment.
The possibility of oral hearings was not discussed at length. At the 
third session of the OEWG, Finland and Mexico stressed the useful-
ness of oral hearings as provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the 
Committee against Torture and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, but did not specifically suggest whether or not 
it should be included in the Optional Protocol.105 At the fourth ses-
sion, Finland and Slovenia supported the possibility of oral hearings 
with basic rules included in the Protocol, while Ethiopia suggested 
that such hearings were better dealt with in the Rules of Procedure.106 
The use of oral hearings has been encouraged as a way of enhancing 
the complaints procedure under OP1-ICCPR.107 Some regional human 
rights mechanisms allow oral hearings. The African Commission, for 
example, allows oral representation.108
The Optional Protocol does not make explicit reference to oral 
hearings or oral documentation when considering individual communi-
cations. However, unlike the OP1-ICCPR,109 the Optional Protocol does 
not explicitly limit the information submitted to the ESCR Committee 
to written information either. It merely refers to ‘all documentation’.110 
It is therefore left to the Committee to decide whether or not to allow 
oral hearings. It is important to note that the inter-state procedure 
under the Optional Protocol makes explicit reference to oral and writ-
ten submissions.111
It should be noted further that the Optional Protocol does not allow for 
public hearings. Similar to OP1-ICCPR, the ESCR Committee is required 
to hold closed meetings when examining communications.112
The question of whether regional mechanisms should be consulted 
was based on the need for the Optional Protocol to take due account 
of, and benefit from, the experiences of existing regional human rights 
mechanisms, and the importance of ensuring co-operation and avoid 
105 Report of the Third Session of the OEWG, para 60.
106 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 107.
107 See Steiner et al (n 7 above) 895.
108 The legal basis for oral presentations is found in art 46 of the African Charter, which 
allows the African Commission to resort to any appropriate method of investigation 
and hear from any other person capable of enlightening it. See R Murray ‘Decisions 
by the African Commission on individual communications under the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 412 427.
109 Art 5(1) of OP1-ICCPR states: ‘The Committee shall consider communications 
received under the present Protocol in the light of all written information made 
available to it by the individual and by the state party concerned.’
110 Art 8(1) OP-ICESCR.
111 Art 10(1)(g) OP-ICESCR.
112 Art 8(2) of OP-ICESCR as well as art 5(3) of OP1-ICCPR read: ‘The Committee 
shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under the present 
Protocol.’
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duplication between regional and UN human rights mechanisms. Dur-
ing the discussions of the OEWG, a number of states supported the 
possibility of seeking additional information on a case from international 
and regional mechanisms, including from UN specialised agencies.113 
Under the Optional Protocol, the ESCR Committee114
may consult, as appropriate, relevant documentation emanating from 
other United Nations bodies, specialised agencies, funds, programmes and 
mechanisms, and other international organisations, including from regional 
human rights systems, and any observations or comments by the state party 
concerned.
Hence, international NGOs with expertise in the area under consider-
ation may be consulted as well.
It is worth noting that the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
wanted a specific provision to be included requiring the ESCR Com-
mittee, when considering communications dealing with matters 
falling within the ILO’s competence, to invite it to participate in the 
examination of the communication. However, this proposal did not 
receive much support, since article 8(3) already makes provision for 
information from specialised agencies. The ILO subsequently withdrew 
its proposal on the understanding that it would be accommodated in 
the practice of the Committee.115
Furthermore, the OEWG discussed at length what standard the ESCR 
Committee would use in measuring compliance by states with their 
obligations under CESCR. The different criteria for the assessment of 
violations of rights that were considered during the discussions include 
‘reasonableness’, ‘unreasonableness’ and a wide ‘margin of apprecia-
tion’ for states in their policy choices.
A number of states supported the application of the standard of 
reasonableness.116 This standard is consistent with both international 
and domestic standards of review in the field of economic, social and 
cultural rights. In fact, many international human rights treaties con-
tain several references to the concept of reasonableness, UN treaty 
bodies have also used the concept in different contexts and with regard 
to various rights, and the concept has been largely used either as a 
113 Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Germany, Italy, Nigeria, Poland, Slovenia, 
Spain and Switzerland. Ethiopia proposed adding a reference to UN-specialised 
agencies (see Report of the Third Session of the OEWG, para 61; Report of the Fourth 
Session of the OEWG, paras 90 & 91).
114 Art 8(3) OP-ICESCR.
115 Report of the Fifth Session of the OEWG, para 175.
116 Belgium, Chile, Finland, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Spain (see Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 94). The NGO Coali-
tion also supported the use of the standard of reasonableness but suggested, for 
purpose of clarification, the addition of ‘effectiveness’ (see Joint Submission of the 
NGO Coalition to the 2008 Open-Ended Working Group to consider options for an 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, February 2008).
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criterion relating to the time frame for carrying out an action or as a 
criterion for legitimate restrictions on rights.117 In addition, the South 
African Constitutional Court also applies this standard in assessing the 
state’s compliance with its obligation to take steps towards realising 
a right, as the state could adopt a wide range of measures to meet its 
obligations, but the question that remains to be answered is whether 
the measures are reasonable.118
Other states expressed concern over the term ‘reasonableness’.119 
The United States was against the use of the term, and proposed its 
replacement with the concept of ‘unreasonableness’ and the addition 
of a reference to ‘the broad margin of appreciation of the state party 
to determine the optimum use of its resources’.120 The test of ‘unrea-
sonableness’ is to the effect that an administrative decision would be 
considered unreasonable if the court considers it to be a decision that 
no reasonable body could have come to.121 Reference is also made to 
the concept of unreasonableness in South African administrative law. 
Article 6(2)(h) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
gives a court or tribunal the power to judicially review an administrative 
action if the exercise of the power or the performance of the function 
authorised by the empowering provision, in pursuance of which the 
administrative action was purportedly taken, ‘is so unreasonable that 
no reasonable person could have so exercised the power or performed 
the function’. Some states at the discussions of the OEWG expressed 
support or interest in the ‘unreasonableness’ standard.122 However, 
others, including the NGO Coalition, objected to the standard, holding 
the view that it is rather restrictive and comes close to amending CESCR, 
especially as the ‘reasonableness’ standard is implicit in the provisions 
117 For the various instances in which the concept has been used, see generally ‘The 
use of the “reasonableness” test in assessing compliance with international human 
rights obligations’ UN Doc A/HRC/8/WG 4/CPR.1, 1 February 2008.
118 The South African Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence is to the effect that, in order 
for measures to be reasonable, they must aim at the effective and expeditious pro-
gressive realisation of the right in question, within the state’s available resources 
for implementation. The measures must be comprehensive, coherent, inclusive, 
balance, flexible, transparent, be properly conceived and properly implemented, 
and make short, medium and long-term provision for those in desperate need or 
in crisis situations. The measures must further clearly set out the responsibilities of 
the different spheres of government and ensure that financial and human resources 
are available for their implementation. See L Chenwi ‘Putting flesh on the skeleton: 
South African judicial enforcement of the right to adequate housing of those subject 
to evictions’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 105 119.
119 Azerbaijan, Denmark, Nigeria, Norway and Russia (see Report of the Fourth Session 
of the OEWG, para 94).
120 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, paras 95 & 95.
121 See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 
KB 223 230.
122 China, India, Japan, Norway, Poland and, surprisingly, the United Kingdom, which 
had earlier shown support for the ‘reasonableness’ standard (see Report of the 
Fourth Session of the OEWG, paras 94 & 95).
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of CESCR as seen in the use of the phrase ‘appropriate means’ in article 
2(1).123
The ‘broad margin of appreciation’ proposal was supported by some 
states.124 However, the NGO Coalition as well as other states expressed 
concern about referring to the ‘broad margin of appreciation’, arguing 
that, while it is implicit in CESCR, it is a flexible notion the application 
whereof varies depending on the specific context and the right in ques-
tion; it would undermine the core objective of the Protocol; increase 
the burden of proof on victims; and it could undermine the sovereignty 
of states.125
As noted above, the standard of review in the Optional Protocol is 
that of ‘reasonableness’ and there is no explicit reference to the ‘mar-
gin of appreciation’ of states. The particular provision reads:126
When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Commit-
tee shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the state party 
in accordance with part II of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee 
shall bear in mind that the state party may adopt a range of possible policy 
measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
It is hoped that, when applying this standard, the ESCR Committee 
would draw inspiration from the existing jurisprudence at the interna-
tional and national levels that have applied this standard.
3.7 Inter-state communications
Inter-state communications procedures allow a state to bring a com-
plaint against another, so as to ensure that the other state abides by its 
treaty obligations. Such procedures have been included in other UN 
human rights treaties.127
Article 10 of the Optional Protocol makes provision for the ESCR 
Committee to receive and consider communications from a state party 
alleging that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations under 
CESCR. The procedure is optional — ‘opt-in’ — as state parties have to 
declare that they recognise the competence of the ESCR Committee 
in this regard before the provision can be applicable to them. This is 
123 Belgium, Ethiopia, Mexico, Portugal, Slovenia (see Report of the Fourth Session of 
the OEWG, para 95).
124 Austria, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, the Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Venezuela (see 
Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 96; Report of the Fifth Session of the 
OEWG, paras 91, 145 & 230).
125 The states that were not in support of the reference to margin of appreciation include 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, France, Ger-
many, India, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Portugal, the Russian Federation and Sri Lanka 
(see Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 100; Report of the Fifth Session 
of the OEWG, paras 91 & 171).
126 Art 8(4) OP-ICESCR.
127 Eg, art 41 of CCPR, art 21 of CAT, art 76 of CRMW and art 11 of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965 (CERD).
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similar to most treaties. Acceptance of an inter-state complaints proce-
dure is optional in CCPR, CAT and CRMW. However, it is mandatory in 
CERD, as well as, at the regional level, under, for instance, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).
Inter-state communications received much attention during the 
discussions of the OEWG, particularly in relation to whether or not it 
should be included and whether it should be mandatory or optional. 
This was partly because similar procedures under other human rights 
mechanisms have hardly been used. In fact, no inter-state communica-
tion has been submitted under any of the UN human rights treaties. 
However, at the regional level, as at 2007, 13 have been decided under 
the European human rights system and one under the African human 
rights system.128
Though states were sceptical or had reservations129 about the proce-
dure during the discussions of the OEWG, a number of states supported 
its inclusion in the Optional Protocol, especially as an optional proce-
dure.130 Under the Optional Protocol to CESCR, states may withdraw 
from this procedure at any time by notification to the Secretary-General 
in terms of the declaration made under article 10. Once the notification 
of withdrawal has been received, the ESCR Committee can no longer 
receive communications against the state party concerned.131
3.8 Inquiry procedure
Inquiry procedures are generally important as they allow the super-
visory bodies to respond, in a timely fashion, to grave or systematic 
violations that are in progress. Articles 11 and 12 make provision for 
an inquiry procedure. Similar to the interstate procedure, the inquiry 
procedure is an ‘opt-in’ one. The ESCR Committee is able to respond 
to ‘grave or systematic violations’ based on ‘reliable information’ it 
receives. The inquiry procedure is different from communications pro-
cedures in that, in the inquiry procedure, the ESCR Committee does 
not have to receive a formal complaint; it is up to it to decide to initiate 
the procedure and there is no victim requirement.
A similar procedure exists under CAT and the OP-CEDAW and both 
are ‘opt-out’, as states may enter a reservation that they do not recogn-
ise the competence of the respective committee in this regard.132
128 Viljoen (n 67 above) 35.
129 Russia had reservations; and China, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, 
Senegal, Syria, Russia and the United Kingdom were not in support of its inclusion 
(see Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 109; Report of the Fifth Session 
of the OEWG, paras 95 & 177).
130 Argentina, Egypt, France, Ghana, Poland, Mexico, the Netherlands, South Africa, 
Spain and Venezuela as well as the NGO Coalition (see Report of the Fourth Session 
of the OEWG, para 109; Report of the Fifth Session of the OEWG, para 94).
131 Art 10(2) OP-ICESCR.
132 See art 20 of OP-CAT and arts 8, 9 & 10 of OP-CEDAW
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During the discussions of the OEWG, its inclusion was justified on 
the grounds that it would allow a response to be made to serious 
violations in a timely manner and it could be used by individuals and 
groups facing difficulties in accessing the communication procedure or 
in danger of reprisal.133 Accordingly, several states and the NGO Coali-
tion supported its inclusion, with some emphasising that it must be 
optional.134 Others were not in support of or expressed reservations 
about such a procedure,135 while Denmark wanted it to be limited to 
cases of non-discrimination or other fundamental and well-defined 
principles.136 Some of the concerns were based on the fear of an overlap 
between this procedure and the work of UN Special Rapporteurs.137
The inquiry procedure is confidential at all stages — all meetings of 
the ESCR Committee dealing with an inquiry procedure are closed — 
but the results can be included in the Committee’s report following 
consultation with the state concerned. The ESCR Committee is also 
required to seek the co-operation of the state concerned at all stages 
of the proceedings. Moreover, where the ESCR Committee decides 
to initiate a visit to the state concerned, it cannot do so without the 
state’s consent. The practical challenge would be getting states to 
fully co-operate with regard to country visits, as consent itself does 
not necessarily guarantee full co-operation. Hence, respect for state 
sovereignty is a key element in the procedure.
It should be noted that a state party can, at any time, withdraw the 
declaration under article 11.138 Unlike with the inter-state commu-
nication procedure, it is not clear whether the ESCR Committee can 
continue with an inquiry it commenced before the withdrawal notifica-
tion, due to the absence of the qualification contained in article 10 of 
the Optional Protocol.
3.9 Follow-up mechanism
Generally, follow-up mechanisms may take various forms, including 
calling on the offending state to discuss the measures it has taken 
to give effect to the recommendations, or inviting the state party to 
include in its report the details of the measures taken. The advantage 
of the follow-up procedure is that it opens an avenue for addressing 
problems encountered when implementing views and recommenda-
tions and guarantees that they would be actually implemented. It also 
allows for guidance and support to be provided to states regarding 
133 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 111.
134 Austria, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, Liechtenstein, Portugal, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sweden (see Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 111).
135 Australia, China, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Poland, Russia and the United States.
136 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 112.
137 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 113.
138 Art 11(8) OP-ICESCR.
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measures taken to comply with the decisions. In addition, it is a means 
of assessing the impact of the decisions of the ESCR Committee on the 
lives of those affected or others living in the state concerned.
Article 9 of the Optional Protocol emphasises the obligation of states 
to implement the views and recommendations of the ESCR Committee 
and enables the Committee to monitor their implementation. It requires 
a state party to submit to the Committee, within six months, a written 
response to its views and recommendations, including information 
on any action taken in light of the views and recommendations. The 
Committee may invite the state party to submit further information on 
any measures taken in response to its views or recommendations in its 
subsequent state party report under CESCR.139 This provision ensures 
that decisions and recommendations are effectively enforced.
The provision on follow-up to the views of the ESCR Committee was 
not a controversial one. In fact, the Optional Protocol to CESCR goes a 
step further than the OP1-ICCPR, as the latter does not explicitly pro-
vide for a follow-up mechanism. Rather, it only requires the Human 
Rights Committee to transmit its views to the parties.140 However, rule 
95 of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee allows 
it to ‘designate a Special Rapporteur for follow-up on views adopted 
under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol, for the purpose 
of ascertaining the measures taken by state parties to give effect to the 
Committee’s views’.141 The Optional Protocol to CESCR does not make 
reference to a Special Rapporteur, but it is important that this issue 
be addressed in the Rules of Procedure as the ESCR Committee might 
not have the capacity to follow up on views on its own. Furthermore, 
though the Human Rights Committee had adopted a statement indi-
cating that the state has to reply within a period not exceeding 180 
days, in practice, it usually indicates a period of 90 days.142 It would be 
interesting to see if, in practice, the ESCR Committee will stick to the 
six month period or reduce it as the Human Rights Committee usually 
does. It would also be interesting to see the extent to which states will 
comply with the follow-up procedure, since it is contained in the treaty 
itself, as states have not often co-operated with the Human rights Com-
mittee in this regard.
In addition, the inquiry procedure, just like the individual commu-
nications procedure, includes a follow-up mechanism. This gives the 
ESCR Committee room to monitor the implementation of its recom-
mendations and the measures taken by a state party in response to the 
inquiry conducted.
139 Art 9(3) OP-ICESCR.
140 Art 5(4) OP1-ICCPR.
141 Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/3/Rev 6 of 
24 April 2001.
142 De Wet (n 59 above) 541.
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3.10 International assistance and co-operation and the fund
Article 14 of the Optional Protocol requires the ESCR Committee to 
transmit, when appropriate, to UN specialised agencies, funds and 
programmes and other competent bodies, its views and recommenda-
tions concerning communications and inquiries that indicate a need 
for technical advice or assistance. This has to be done with the consent 
of the state party concerned.143
The importance of international co-operation and assistance as a 
tool in ensuring enhanced implementation of economic, social and 
cultural rights in general, and the views and recommendations of the 
ESCR Committee in particular, was highlighted during the discussions 
of OEWG.144 It is an obligation of states that is underlined in articles 
2(1), 11(1) and (2), 15(4), 22 and 23 of CESCR, and is based on free 
consent.145 The view of the ESCR Committee is that in the absence of 
an active programme of international assistance and co-operation on 
the part of all those states that are in a position to undertake one, the 
full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights will remain an 
unfulfilled aspiration in many countries.146 In fact, one of the roles of 
the ESCR Committee is147
to encourage greater attention to efforts to promote economic, social and 
cultural rights within the framework of international development co-oper-
ation activities undertaken by, or with the assistance of, the United Nations 
and its agencies.
At the regional level, looking at the African system, for instance, inter-
national co-operation and assistance is an objective of the African 
Union (AU).148
Though Venezuela observed that the state reporting procedure was 
more appropriate to identify needs for technical assistance, a number 
of states supported its inclusion in the Optional Protocol.149
143 Art 14(1) OP-ICESCR.
144 See, eg, Explanatory Memorandum, para 35 22.
145 Art 11(2) CESCR.
146 General Comment 3 on the nature of state parties’ obligations, 14/12/1990, para 
14, UN Doc E/1991/23. In the same General Comment, the ESCR Committee also 
observed that the phrase ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ was intended by 
the drafters of CESCR to refer to both the resources existing within a state and those 
available from the international community through international co-operation and 
assistance (para 13).
147 General Comment 2 on international technical assistance measures, 02/02/1990, 
para 3, UN Doc E/1990/23.
148 See art 3(d) of the Constitutive Act of the AU; art 2(1)(e) of the Charter of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In addition, African states have an obligation to 
promote international (economic) co-operation (see the Preamble to and art 21(3) 
of the African Charter).
149 Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United King-
dom (see Report of the fourth Session of the OEWG, para 122).
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Furthermore, article 14(3) makes provision for the establishment of 
a fund to provide
expert and technical assistance to state parties, with the consent of the state 
party concerned, for the enhanced implementation of the rights contained in 
the Covenant, thus contributing to building national capacities in the area of 
economic, social and cultural rights in the context of the present Protocol.
States are the direct beneficiaries of the fund, though victims were 
also beneficiaries in earlier drafts and some states had indicated their 
support for providing assistance to victims.150 Moreover, the kind of 
assistance under the fund is not financial assistance, but ‘expert and 
technical’ assistance. It is important to note that issues relating to the 
modalities of the fund have not been addressed in the Optional Proto-
col, but have been left to the General Assembly.
The establishment of a fund was proposed as a means of encourag-
ing and facilitating international assistance and co-operation. Some 
human rights treaties make provision for the establishment of a fund. 
For instance, the Optional Protocol to CAT, 2002 (OP-CAT) establishes a 
fund to help finance the implementation of the recommendations made 
by the Sub-Committee on Prevention after a Visit to a State Party, as well 
as education programmes of the national preventive mechanisms.151 
This fund is financed through voluntary contributions made by govern-
ments, inter-governmental organisations, NGOs and other private or 
public entities.152 Also, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 1998, establishes a fund for the benefit of victims of crimes within 
its jurisdiction and their families.153 This fund is financed through money 
and other property collected through fines or forfeiture to be transferred, 
by order of the Court, to the trust fund. The Rome Statute does not 
exclude the possibility that it might be financed from other sources, and 
it sketches the general outlines of the trust fund, leaving the Assembly of 
State Parties to decide on how to implement it in practice.
While the establishment of a fund received some support,154 a major-
ity of states objected to it.155 The objections were based on the risk of 
150 Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Germany, India, Sweden and Switzer-
land, for instance, supported the provision of assistance to victims. Russia supported 
assistance to both victims and states (see Report of the fifth Session of the OEWG, 
paras 184 & 192).
151 Art 26 OP-CAT.
152 The fund is not yet formally established by the General Assembly.
153 Art 79 Rome Statute.
154 Algeria, Austria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt (on behalf of the African 
Group), Germany, Slovenia and Ukraine (see Report of the Fourth Session of the 
OEWG, para 127; and Report of the Fifth Session of the OEWG, paras 107, 114, 115, 
117 & 183).
155 Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States 
(see Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 127; and Report of the Fifth 
Session of the OEWG, paras 107, 114, 115, 117 & 183).
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duplicating other funds and the practical difficulties in implementing 
and managing the fund. It was also argued that there are dangers in 
linking violations to funding and that the fund would involve high 
administrative costs and imposes an additional burden on the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).156 It was pointed 
out, however, that concerns about duplication had not been an issue 
when OP-CAT was adopted, the fear of additional burden for the OHCHR 
should not prevent the creation of the fund, and that developing coun-
tries could not fully realise the rights in CESCR without international 
assistance.157 One thing that was clear from states, even those who 
supported the fund, was that the fund should not be mandatory.158
4 Conclusion
Individual complaints procedures are vital in that they further develop 
and fine-tune international human rights law, create precedents, draw 
attention to the specific, concrete human rights violation, making 
the problem and the victim more visible, and the remedy more spe-
cific and implemental.159 Though some writers have questioned the 
establishment of this new international adjudicative mechanism,160 
the benefits of having the Optional Protocol to CESCR are numerous: 
It would encourage state parties to ensure more effective local rem-
edies; promote the development of international jurisprudence which 
would in turn promote the development of domestic jurisprudence on 
economic, social and cultural rights; strengthen international account-
ability; enable the adjudicating body to study concrete cases and thus 
enable it to create a more concise jurisprudence; help empower vul-
156 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, paras 129 & 168; Report of the Fifth 
Session of the OEWG, para 114. The funds administered by the UN Secretary-General 
and the OHCHR include a Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, Voluntary Trust 
Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Popula-
tions, and a Voluntary Fund for Technical Co-operation in the Field of Human Rights. 
These funds have a specific focus, are voluntary, and most of them either provide 
assistance to NGOs assisting victims or assist representative organisations or com-
munities to participate in meetings.
157 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 130.
158 Report of the Fourth Session of the OEWG, para 165.
159 A de Zayas ‘The examination of individual complaints by the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights’ in Alfredsson et al (n 10 above) 73.
160 See, eg, M Dennis & D Stewart ‘Justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights: 
Should there be an international complaints mechanism to adjudicate the rights to 
food, water, housing and health’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 
462-515.
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nerable and marginal groups; and would combat arguments against 
the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights.161
The next step is the effective implementation of the Optional Protocol, 
which is challenging, considering its ‘optional’ nature and the continu-
ous existence of objections to the justiciability of economic, social and 
cultural rights as evidenced in the discussions of the OEWG. There are a 
number of challenges to the implementation of the Optional Protocol, 
including: getting states to ratify; accessibility to the mechanism since 
victims would need to have the financial means to travel to Geneva, 
Switzerland, where the ESCR Committee is based, should they have to 
testify during hearings; and ensuring effective implementation of the 
request for interim measures, and the views and recommendations of 
the Committee, which are non-binding and left to the political will of 
states.162 The effective implementation of the views and recommenda-
tions of the ESCR Committee is another challenge, as is the case with 
the implementation of the recommendations of other human rights 
bodies.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the Optional Protocol has been 
seen as an important mechanism to expose visible economic, social 
and cultural rights abuses that are usually linked to poverty, discrimina-
tion and neglect.163 Most importantly, it has brought CESCR into line 
with other human rights treaties by placing economic, social and cul-
tural rights on an equal footing with civil and political rights, thereby 
correcting the historical asymmetry between these categories of rights 
and emphasising their indivisibility and interrelatedness.
161 Report of the First Session of the OEWG, paras 23 & 67-70.See also P Alston ‘Establish-
ing a right to petition under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
in Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (1995) 107, quoted in H Steiner 
et al International human rights In context: Law, politics, morals (2007) 363-364.
162 For additional reading on the challenges to the implementation of the OP-ICESCR, 
see C Golay ‘The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ CETIM Critical Report No 2, November 2008 http://www.
cetim.ch/en/documents/CETIM-Report-2.pdf (accessed 20 January 2009).
163 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, when congratulating HRC 
on its adoption of OP-ICESCR (Press release, 2008). 
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